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Public Schooling, Indoctrination,
and Totalitarianism
John R. Lott, Jr.*
I. Introduction
The standard public goods argument for education assumes that
a better educated populace is more likely to support democracy. This
presupposes that either more educated people are inclined to make
decisions for themselves or that education inherently instills the
belief that democracy is desirable (Cohn, 1979, p. 206 and Solmon,
1982, p. 8). These arguments largely depend on the level of
marketable human capital, such as literacy and reasoning ability, and
ignores the question of methods: subsidies versus public provision.
Yet, politicians in more totalitarian countries should wish to avoid
creating a more independent and critically reasoning constituency.
Hence, the public good explanation would imply a consistent
negative relationship between totalitarianism and expenditures on
public schooling.1 I will provide evidence that this is not the
relationship that we observe.
While many others have argued that public schooling may serve
to indoctrinate (e.g., see surveys in Sowell (1995) and Lott
(1987c)),2 this paper asks what are the characteristics of
* John M. Olin Fellow in Law and Economics, University of Chicago Law
School. I would like to thank Gertrud Fremling, Victor Fuchs, Sam Peltzman,
Eric Posner, Mark Ramseyer, an unsually helpful referee and the participants at
the Symposium in Honor of Gary S. Becker’s 65th Birthday and a seminar at
the University of Chicago’s Law School and department of economics for their
helpful comments. I would also like to acknowledge my appreciation for the
funding I received from the Law School’s John M. Olin Law and Economics
Fellowship program.
1 This argument implicitly makes the assumption that more educated people see
democracy as a good. It is not readily apparent why this is necessarily true.
Maybe relatively educated people, who are thus supposedly relatively wealthier,
feel a more totalitarian government is better equipped to protect their property.
2 For previous work on the formation of individual preferences/views see
Becker (1996), Sunstein (1996), Thompson and Ruther (1983), and Lott
(1990). This literature debates whether changing the cost of different types of
information alters peoples’ preferences or whether these views are independent
of these innate preferences. For the discussion here this distinction is not
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governments that have the greatest returns to indoctrination are
more likely to own the media and are in fact making larger
investments in public education. Are these governments also more
likely to exhibit those societal characteristics which make direct
parental involvement in their children’s lives more costly?
Governments have gone to great lengths to instill desired values
in children. Yet, it is not just Germany during the 1930’s and 1940’s
or communist countries like the former Soviet Union that have
actively tried to influence children’s views.3 A good example is
Sweden, which aggressively instituted a very costly system of nursery
school care. When Ingvar Carlsson (the current Prime Minister)
was education minister he said: “School is the spearhead of
Socialism” and “pre-school training is essential ‘to eliminate the
social heritage’” of undesirable parental views (Huntford, 1972, pp.
222 and 233). Swedish educational theorists even advocated tax and
government employment policies “to get both parents out of the
home, so that children are forced out as well” (p. 222, and see also
Rosen, 1996).
After briefly discussing why countries which are more
totalitarian and create larger wealth transfers experience greater
returns to indoctrination, Section III updates statistical evidence
comparing primary and secondary school expenditures with public
ownership of television as well as public medical expenditures. The
following sections then test whether educational expenditures were
influenced by the fall of communism and analyze how family
structure as well as the amount of time that children are removed
from their family changes with the type of government. Finally, the
last section provides some preliminary evidence on whether teacher
crucial, though I will assume, as in my 1984 dissertation, that changing the
relative costs of different types of information produces different views and not
different underlying preferences.
3 For example, during the 1920’s and 1950’s, the Soviet Union experimented
with raising children in “communal children’s houses, dining halls, and other
institutions that would decrease the importance of the individual household”
(Shipler, 1983, pp. 88-89). While fighting in Afghanistan during the 1980’s,
the Soviet government forcibly took tens of thousands of 3 and 4 year old
Afghanis to the USSR to be raised away from the influences of their families
(Amstutz, 1986). The hope was that when later returned to Afghanistan they
would form the core of a loyal government administration.
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salaries can be used to encourage the dissemination of progovernment information by examining how South African teachers’
salaries vary by race.
II. Outlining the Theory
In past work, I have offered an explanation as to why education
was publicly provided across all countries by starting with the
assumption that political entrepreneurs maximize support by
regulating the size and distribution of “wealth transfers” subject to
the costs of creating the transfers (Peltzman, 1976 and Becker, 1976
and 1983). While larger transfers increase the opposition generated
by net losers, politicians can make investments in mitigating this
opposition. Force is one such option—for example, by outlawing the
organization of opposition political parties or jailing opponents
(“totalitarianism”)—but controlling the information received by
citizens (“indoctrination”) can also be effective. When the cost of
pro-transfer information falls and that of anti-transfer information
rises, views more favorable to the government are generated. The
greater the perceived “legitimacy” or “fairness” of existing transfers,
the lower the opposition. Like public ownership of the news media,
government provided schooling decreases the cost of wealth transfers
by changing the relative cost of acquiring different information and
predisposing students to support certain transfers. Educational
subsidies are not as effective as public schooling in instilling these
views because the increased competition for students will create
incentives for educators to provide the information that customers
and not authorities value (Lott, 1987b).
Building on Peltzman’s (1976) work, my model showed that
public educational expenditures should increase with “totalitarianism”
as well as government transfers (Lott, 1990, pp. 201-8). The model
assumes that totalitarianism has two effects: 1) it increases the cost
of organizing opposition groups but 2) it restricts the opportunity set
of individuals and hence lowers their real wealth, and this works to
increase the level of opposition.4 The effectiveness of totalitarianism
in deterring effective opposition increases at a decreasing rate, while
4

These restrictions on peoples’ opportunity sets can take many forms from
limiting where individuals may go or with whom they may associate.
Presumably such force is used only because it alters people’s opportunity set.
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diminishing marginal utility of wealth results in opposition created
by these restrictions increasing at an increasing rate. Higher levels of
totalitarianism produce diminishing returns to controlling the
citizenry through force and increases the marginal return to
indoctrination. The model also predicts that as a country’s income
increases, the opposition arising from any given level of
totalitarianism—and thus the return to indoctrination—falls. This
paper uses Freedom House’s Comparative Survey of Freedom Index
on political freedom and civil liberties to measure totalitarianism.
The components of the index, as listed in the footnote, measure
many different costs of opposition from the existence of multiple
political parties to fairness of vote tabulation to military control.5
The return to investments in indoctrination should also be
related to the level of governmental wealth transfers. As wealth
transfers increase and opposition rises, the marginal return to
indoctrination also rises. Since all government actions create some
wealth transfers, I assume that government size proxies for the level
of transfers.
The tests attempt to examine how investments in indoctrination
change with the type of government. Unfortunately, direct measures
of educational expenditures on indoctrination are not available. As a
substitute, total public educational expenditures (which consist of
both investments in human capital as well as indoctrination) are
regressed on totalitarianism, government size, and other variables
explaining investments in human capital, such as income. The
theory is then tested by studying other similar types of goods—for
example, television broadcasting, which provides knowledge but also
5 These include: 1) are multiple political parties (or other means by which
opposition to government policy may be organized) allowed, 2) is candidacy
reasonably open, 3) is there fair polling or tabulation of votes, 4) have the
country's most important leaders been recently elected, 5) does the opposition
attain local or regional office, 6) is the government free of military and foreign
control, 7) the existence of the rule of law (including the independence of the
judiciary and the legitimacy of policy behavior), 8) open public discussion of
issues before the country, 9) freedom from political censorship, and 10)
independence of the media from the government (though public ownership is
definitely not one of the components of the index (for example, Sweden's
broadcast media is publicly owned but is defined as independent of direct
government control since it is an independent public corporation and staffing
appointments are not political appointments).
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may be used for indoctrination. If government control of television
increases with totalitarianism or wealth transfers, it is more plausible
that such a relationship also holds for education.6 Where data are
available, measures of political stability are examined.
III. Schooling, Wealth Transfers, and Totalitarianism:
Some Evidence
A. Government Control of Television
Few people would be surprised that totalitarian governments
favor government ownership of television. Under private provision,
license revocal or the threat to revoke, could be used to influence
programming, it probably does not constitute a perfect substitute for
direct ownership (e.g., Klein, Crawford, and Alchian, 1978). I thus
predict a positive relation between ownership and totalitarianism. To
6

Given the long-run returns to instilling certain values in children, a
question arises as to how democratically elected politicians can internalize the
returns to these investments. One answer is provided by Alchian (1950),
Becker (1976), and Brennan and Buchanan (1980), who argue that efficiency
alone, without a consciously planned process involved, can explain why "rules
of thumb" and institutions are adopted. Institutions that have the lowest costs
of transferring wealth produce the most political support and are the least likely
to be challenged. If an efficiency explanation exists for public schooling (for
example, it lowers the cost of creating transfers), public provision can be
explained with "as if" statements concerning human motivations. Long-lived,
strong political parties that punish politicians who fail to support investments
in indoctrination may also solve this problem. Yet two other mechanisms
besides strong political parties can insure that society internalizes the effects of
indoctrination. First, the constituencies which receive these long term benefits
could support only politicians who vote to inculcate the desired values.
Secondly, if politicians are ideologues, as assumed in Lott (1987a), the
politicians value not only producing current support but also value the transfers
they create. The assumption that ideologues consume "having done the right
thing" can be easily extended to them intrinsically valuing education's moral
indoctrination and/or the resulting future transfers. The greater the extent that
politicians value these moral beliefs or future transfers, the more they will
internalize the returns to these investments. Unlike investments in police, the
investments in indoctrination may take a relatively long time to produce
politically beneficial results, and as with any other capital should continue to
affect views even after the indoctrination stop. For instance, Stalin remained
popular in Russia even though he no longer controlled the instruments of
repression.
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test my hypothesis, I ran the following probit regression pooling
data for 1985 and 1987:
The term GOVERNMENT O WNERSHIP OF TV denotes
whether a country’s television stations are publicly (GOVERNMENT
TV = 1) or privately owned (GOVERNMENT TV = 0).7 Which
category, public or private television ownership, was judged on the
basis of which type possessed the most transmitting power and,
when that was not available, by the relative number of transmitters.
Most countries have either complete government or complete private
ownership.8
GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP OF TVi = c + b1
T OTALITARIANISM R ATINGi+ b2 REAL PER C APITA GDP i
+ b3 (GOVERMENT EXPENDITURES/GDP)i +
b4 (TOTALITARIANISM R ATING*REAL PER C APITA GDP) i +
b4 Year Dummy 1987 + ui
(1)
The T OTALITARIANISM index using the Freedom House’s
Comparative Survey of Freedom Index on political freedom and civil
liberties ranges from values of 2 to 14 (both the political freedom and
civil liberty variables separately range from 1 to 7), with higher
numbers representing more totalitarianism.9 The ratio of
7

The countries used in this sample were: Algeria, Burkina Faso, Burundi,
Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique,
Swaziland, Togo, Uganda, Tanzania, Zaire, Zambia, Canada, Costa Rica,
Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Panama, Saint Kitts, United States, Columbia,
Ecuador, Guyana, Venezuela, Bangladesh, India, Israel, Japan, Jordan,
Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Sri Lanka,
Syria, United Arab Emirates, Austria, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Denmark,
Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta,
Norway, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland, Yugoslavia, and USSR. Observations
on a couple of countries had two observations.
8 Given the available information for television, the ownership of transmitters
seems virtually identical to the ownership of programming. With the advent of
cable television, many countries that previously had purely public ownership of
transmitters now allow large portions of their populations to have access to
many different sources of programming.
9 For a discussion that parallels my use of these variables please see Milton
Friedman’s discussion in Block (1991).
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government expenditures to the gross national product expressed as a
percentage proxies for the level of transfers. The term R EAL PER
C APITA GDP is measured in 1985 dollars and was obtained from
Heston and Summers World Penn Tables.10 Finally, the interactive
term multiplies the level of totalitarianism by the per capita GDP.
Table 1 shows the data’s means and standard deviations.
As noted earlier, I expected the probability of government
television ownership to increase with either TOTALITARIANISM
RATING or government transfers and decrease with higher values of
(TOTALITARIANISM R ATING *REAL P ER C APITA GDP).
Higher levels of government transfers might measure left out
variables which increase government spending generally and be
described as a “taste” for public ownership. Alternatively, the higher
the level of net transfers in a country, the greater the opposition
produced and the higher is the marginal political product of an
additional increment of indoctrination. Real per capita GDP is also
included in the regression, though unlike our later estimates for
education its effect on government ownership of television is
ambiguous. It can be negative because with higher incomes people
want to purchase more private provision. On the other hand, it may
be positive as increased levels of income imply more wealth to
potentially redistribute.
Using data from 58 countries, equation (1) was estimated as
shown in the first row in Table 2. The results all confirm the
hypothesis. In all cases the coefficient is of the expected sign, and
they are significant for T OTALITARIANISM R ATING or
government transfers. Taking the derivative of this regression with
respect to the level of totalitarianism, I find that when real per capita
GDP is less than $37,987, increases in totalitarianism raise the
probability of government ownership. Since the highest real per
capita GDP was $19,648 for the United Arab Emirates, an increase
in the totalitarianism rating increases the probability of government
ownership.11 Rows 2 and 3 show that these results are not sensitive
to the inclusion of either the per capita GDP or the interactive term.
10
11

This was available through the NBER on the internet.
In fact, the mean value of real per capita income for all 121 countries for
which it could be obtained in 1987, was only $5,012.
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B. Totalitarianism and Expenditures on Schooling
As discussed earlier, the same relationship should hold for
schooling if totalitarian governments derive important benefits such
as indoctrination from public schooling. To test the relationship
between totalitarianism and educational expenditures, I again use the
model shown in equation (1), with minor alterations. The first
modification is that real current (i.e., noncapital) public educational
expenditures per capita (in dollars) replaces government ownership of
television. The government transfers variable is replaced with a “net
government transfers” variable, government spending net of total
school expenditures. This change removes some artificial collinearity
that would otherwise exist between government transfers and
educational expenditures. The new specification is thus:
CURRENT EDUCATIONAL EXPENDITURES PER CAPITAi =
c + b5 TOTALITARIANISM RATINGi +
b6 REAL PER C APITA GDP i+
b7 (GOVERMENT NET OF SCHOOL EXPENDITURES/GDP)I +
b8 (TOTALITARIANISM R ATING*REAL PER C APITA GDP) i +
u2i
(2)
Higher T OTALITARIANISM R ATING and government
transfers should increase educational expenditures, while higher
(TOTALITARIANISM R ATING*REAL P ER C APITA GDP) should
reduce educational expenditures. However, unlike the regressions for
television ownership, higher per capita GDP should increase
expenditures on schooling. I also included a squared per capita GDP
in some of the specifications to account for any possible nonlinearity.
Cross-sectional time-series data for 407 observations from 99
countries are available for the period from 1985 to 1992.12 of Table
3.13 Country effects as well as separate fixed year effects for each
12
13

Unfortunately, information for every country is not available for all years.
The list of countries used in this regression are: Algeria, Botswana,
Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic,
Congo, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi,
Mali, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Seychelles,
Sierra Leone, Somalia, Swaziland, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Tanzania, Zaire,
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continent to allow for variation in time trends were also included.
The Freedom House index shows that Africa, Asia, Europe, North
America, and South America were all becoming freer over this eight
year period, with the largest changes occurring in Europe (mainly
due to the changes in the Communist countries) and Africa where
the average country in these two continents became freer by 3.1 and
2.5 points respectively over this period.
The estimates for equation (2) are shown in the first two rows
argument (discussed earlier) nor the hypothesis that democracies and
totalitarian regimes are equally inclined to instill support. All
coefficients are of the expected sign and are significant at least at the
.01 percent level. According to the first specification, increases in
totalitarianism raise current public expenditures on schooling but
only as long as the real per capita GDP is less than $12,767. 785
observations, 87 percent of the 891 observations for which real per
capita GDP was available, have lower values.14 The results provide
only weak evidence that the marginal return to indoctrination is
lower in wealthier countries.15
Zambia, Zimbabwe, Belize, Canada, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El
Salvador, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Panama, Saint Kitts, Trinada and Tobago,
United States, Chile, Columbia, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, Suriname,
Venezuela, Bangladesh, China, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Japan, Jordan,
Republic of Korea, Kuwait, Malaysia, Oman, Phillippines, Saudi Arabia,
Singapore, Sri Lanka, Syria, United Arab Emirates, Yemen, Austria, Belgium,
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, Federal Republic of Germany,
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Norway, Poland,
Romania, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Yugoslavia, Australia, Fiji, New
Zealand, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Vanuatu, and USSR.
14 This percentage is higher than in my previous study where the
corresponding percentage was 63 percent (Lott, 1990).
15 The unavoidable use of proxy variables along with their inherent
measurement error raises an econometric concern: the model is underidentified
since the set of maximum likelihood solutions contains more than one point.
Measurement error causes no problem if the K reverse regressions all yield
estimates of the same sign on every variable with the direct regression, the
maximum and minimum values for a coefficient from this set of K+1 estimates
are consistent estimates of the endpoints of an interval which contains the true
coefficients. Besides the possibility of measurement error, these proxies are
assumed to differ from the true values by some unknown scaling factor, _. A s
long as the sign of _ is known, the sign of the true coefficient can still be
inferred, which is our real concern (Leamer (1978, p. 238-45)). Unfortunately,
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Not only are the coefficients in the first specification of Table 3
statistically significant, but they also demonstrate the economically
large impact that totalitarianism exerts over school expenditures.
Assuming the mean income for the entire sample ($5012), a one
standard deviation change in the totalitarianism ranking is associated
with that real per capita current education expenditures will rise by
$144.21, a quarter of one standard deviation change in educational
the data do not produce direct and reverse regressions agreeing in sign. For
TOTALITARIANISM RATING the bounds are -116.5 and 1302.59; REAL
PER CAPITA GDP, -.04597 and 1.9176; NET SOCIALISM , -7.77 and 218.8;
and (TOTALITARIANISM RATING*REAL PER C APITA GDP), -.00208 and
-.2577. Specifications without the country dummy variables provide direct and
reverse regressions agreeing in sign. The extreme estimates from these bounded
sets indicate that in 1985 increases in totalitarianism increased current public
expenditures on schooling at least for levels of real per capita GDP up to $860
and possibly to $85,642. 17 percent (or 152) of the 892 countries have real per
capita GDP's less than $860, and even the midpoint for these
bounds—$42,391—is more than two times greater than the highest level of real
per capita GDP in the sample. However, any estimates falling within those
bounds are all equally likely. Thus the data are only unambiguous for values of
per capita real GDP below $860—in that range increases in totalitarianism are
associated with increased expenditures on schooling. No countries fall in the
range where the reverse is true.
Klepper and Leamer (1984) suggest one solution to this estimation
problem which is to introduce additional information on the size of the R2 that
one would observe if all the measurement error were removed. The lower is
one’s estimate of the model’s explanatory power in the absence of measurement
error, the more likely it is that the coefficient estimates can be bounded. For
specification 1 in Table 3, as long as the reader believes that the model in the
absence of measurement error would not explain more than 94 percent of the
variation in current educational expenditures, the results are not affected by
either measurement errors or proxy variable problems. Following Klepper and
Leamer’s lead, as long as R*2 (the R2 obtained with this model assuming no
*2
measurement error) is less than R*2
m (the maximm value of R consistent with
all the regressions in the same orthant) the parameter estimates will be
*2
-1
2
2
bounded. R*2
m is defined by R m = R + (1 - R ) min ((1- (Bij/bj)) ) . B ij is
ij
the j th coefficient from the i th normalized reverse regression and bj is the j th
coefficient from the direct regression (Leamer (1992)). For specification 1 i n
Table 3, R*2
m is .9433.
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expenditures and almost 50 percent of its mean. By comparison, a
one standard deviation change in the government transfers variable
implies a $161 increase in educational expenditures. However, the
dominant influence on educational expenditures is clearly per capita
GDP, where, assuming the mean totalitarianism ranking (7.976), a
one standard deviation change in personal GDP increases per capita
current education expenditures by $377, an amount 2.6 times greater
than a similar change produced by the totalitarianism ranking.16
Rows 3 and 4 in Table 3 report estimates with real per student
current education expenditures. Despite missing data on the number
of students in many countries, the results remain similar to those
already described. Further the results imply that educational
expenditures are a superior good, as the squared term is positive. The
conclusions drawn from the other coefficients are basically
unaffected. As a test of the public goods hypothesis, I also tried
including country population. However, educational expenditures
declined with population and the coefficients that we are focusing
on were slightly more statistically significant than what I already
report.17
16

The regressions in Table 3 were rerun replacing the totalitarianism index
with the Free House Indexes for political freedom and then for civil liberties.
Not surprisingly, given the high correlation between the political freedom and
civil liberty indexes (the correlation coefficient was .93), all the coefficients had
the same signs as before with similar t-statistics.
17 Some may be concerned that "communist" nations are distinct from other
"totalitarian" countries and that their inclusion "biases" these various results i n
my favor. The concern is that communist countries will obviously have both
high levels of totalitarianism and socialism and that it is equally obvious that
they will own the media and, as the anecdotal evidence suggests, have large
expenditures on schooling. This relationship may not hold for other
totalitarian countries.
Two responses can be made to this objection. The first is that this
relationship, which is assumed to be obvious for communist countries, is
exactly what our model predicts. The second involves testing to see if the
observations for the communist countries came from the same model as the
noncommunist ones. To this test, we re-estimated the regressions, when the
communist countries as defined by Freedom House in that sample are excluded.
We cannot reject the hypothesis that the observations from these communist
countries came from the same model as the other countries. Similarly, we
performed the operation for the estimates regarding television ownership. (See
G. S. Maddala, Econometrics, 200 (1977) for the appropriate test where there
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I also ran separate cross-section regressions without the fixed
effects for the sample means for each country and for each of the
eight years, with the purpose to examine whether the results were
driven solely by time series changes in the data and whether these
results are consistent across the years being studied. These results are
reported in rows 5 and 6, and demonstrate a remarkable consistency
with the earlier pooled estimates. While not shown, the results were
consistent across years. With the exception of the net government
transfers variable and the regression using just the 1992 data (which
has the fewest number of observations), all the coefficients were
statistically significant.18
Since the expected return to indoctrination should depend on
how long the government believes it will remain in power, I reran
the regressions using a crude measure of political stability based on
the average yearly rate of coup d’etats a country experienced between
1985 and 1987 (Bienen and Van De Walle, 1991, pp. 109-191).19
Using only the educational expenditure data over that same period of
time and only controlling for the continent dummies because of the
smaller sample, the variable measuring the average number of Coups
was quite insignificant (with t-statistics less than 0.4) and the other
results remained similar to those already reported (though the
government transfers variable was no longer statistically significant).
What about the other theories of education? If education is
publicly valuable because it instills democratic values, then, for any
are not enough observations in the second set to estimate all the regression
parameters.)
18 For example, the coefficients for the totalitarianism variable were: 14.99 (tstatistic = 3.456) for 1985; 26.2 (t-statistic = 2.305) for 1986; 31.14 (t-statistic =
2.342) for 1987; 37.3 (t-statistic = 2.453) for 1988; 34.3 (t-statistic = 2.621) for
1989; 42.4 (t-statistic = 1.739) for 1990; 68.0 (t-statistic = 2.517) for 1991; and
68.28 (t-statistic = 0.982) for 1992. The results do exhibit a definite pattern
where more totalitarian regimes spend more on indoctrination during the later
years, and it is consistent with the current set of results implying a larger
investment in indoctrination than was implied by my earlier results for the
1970’s (Lott, 1990).
19 Posner (1996, pp. 24-5) provides correlations showing that this measure of
coups is positively correlated with other measures of stability, but that the
correlation coefficients are never greater than .5. Ideally, one would prefer
using a turnover rate that encompassed both the period during and after the
investments being made in the indoctrination.
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given level of income, democratic countries should spend relatively
more on public schooling. Likewise, the hypothesis that capitalist
countries try to create a more docile workforce through education
(e.g., Bowles and Gintis, 1976) also predicts that relatively free
market countries should spend more, not less. Yet, according to the
data, it is very clear that the vast majority of democracies with free
market economies that spend less. This finding is remarkably
consistent across different sets of countries and different measures of
educational expenditures.
C. Totalitarianism and Health Care
One possible objection to the preceding results is that
totalitarianism generally increases the size of other similar
government services, which do not have this indoctrination
component. Thus, a similar positive relationship between
totalitarianism and such other expenditures would suggest that there
is nothing unique about public schooling or government ownership
of television. I have chosen to also study health care. Like schooling,
health care could be a means to invest specifically in the
opportunities of children from poor families. But unlike for
schooling, there is no obvious return indoctrination. Any factors
that alter the returns to investing in human capital might similarly
affect both education and those health care expenditures directed
towards the young. My hypothesis is that no significant positive
relationship should exist between totalitarianism and public health
expenditures. To test this, I replaced the endogenous variable for
school expenditures with real per capita public health expenditures
for 1990 (Muarry et. al., 1994, 635-7, only cross sectional data is
available). The government transfers variable was also replaced with
a variable for government spending net of public health
expenditures.
The coefficients in Table 4 analyzing public health care
expenditures shows that increased totalitarianism actually decreases
public health care expenditures for virtually the entire sample. But it
is not distinguishable from zero, as the direct effect of totalitarianism
on spending fails to be statistically significant. There is no indication
that the effect might be large either: it is only 1/20th the size of the
corresponding coefficient for public schooling expenditures.
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Another potential objection is that the coefficients for nonhealth government expenditures may simply be serving as a proxy for
the “taste” for government involvement (see the previous discussion
in Section IIIa). However, I cannot identify such an effect: the
coefficients are both small and insignificant. Comparing Tables 3
and 4, the results are consistent with the hypothesis that schooling
produces an additional return to mitigating the opposition from
these transfers over and above what may be accounted for by “taste.”
Table 4 also has some bearing on interpreting the government
transfers variable. One possibility is that socialist governments are
spending more on public education because they are simply more
concerned with expanding economic opportunities for poor people.
If this explanation was correct, similar results might be expected for
health care. But, according to my findings, this is not the case.
Increased government transfers are associated with a higher
probability of the government owning the television and spending
more on education, but does not correspond to more health care.
This supports the hypothesis that totalitarian governments are
motivated by a greater desire to instill certain values rather than by a
desire to expand services to previously deprived people.
Caution is required in comparing educational and health care
expenditures, however. For example, unlike educational expenditures,
a very large portion of health care is spent on adults and the elderly.
Since a direct measure of children’s health expenditures across
countries was not available, in Table 5 I used UNICEF’s
information on the percent of one-year-old children fully
immunized against tuberculosis, DPT, polio, and measles. The share
of pregnant women who were fully immunized against tetanus
yielded another suitable measure. These data were available yearly
from 1985 to 1992.
I used these two alternative measures, for regression analysis,
trying various specifications: time-series cross-sectional pooled data
with individual country and year fixed effects; pooled data with
individual county and continent specific year fixed effects; and the
cross-sectional regressions on the sample means for each country.20
All but one of the specifications show the opposite relationship
20

The estimates using continent specific year fixed effects are not reported, but
they produce less significant results.
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between totalitarianism and children’s health care compared to what
earlier regressions found between totalitarianism and educational
expenditures. Half of these regressions imply that when incomes are
below the sample mean income of $5,849, totalitarian countries will
have lower immunization rates than will freer countries. The average
income for countries with a totalitarianism ranking above the mean
(7.98) is only $2,778. In fact, 81 percent of the observations for
where the totalitarianism ranking is above the mean have incomes
less than $5,849.
IV. The Fall of Communism and
Its Effect on Educational Expenditures
The recent fall of Communism in Eastern Europe and the
former Soviet Union provides a natural experiment. If my theory is
correct, educational spending should fall due to the decline in
totalitarianism. The long-run returns to educational investments in
human capital are also likely to have changed with communism’s
fall. To help control for the changing returns to investments in
human capital, we can compare the changing public expenditures in
education with public expenditures for health care.21 A simple
human capital hypothesis might predict that total public education
expenditures would temporarily rise relative to public health care
expenditures simply because many individuals may want to make
investments that allow them to switch careers. But if the
indoctrination hypothesis is correct, educational expenditures should
have decreased relative to health care spending.
Comparing public schooling and health expenditures is also
motivated because real income estimates were available for relatively
few post-communist observations for Eastern Europe or the former
Soviet Republics.22 UNICEF (1995) provides consistent yearly data
21

Another possibility would have been to compare educational expenditures as
a share of total government expenditures, but good data on this was extremely
limited during this transitional period.
22 The data used to measure real income was taken from Heston and Summers.
Even if these estimates were available countries making the transition from
communism, income is likely to be measured with a great deal of noise during
this period (e.g., there is the problem that while prices have risen, people will
no longer have to wait long times in queues).
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on these two levels of expenditures for Albania, Bulgaria, the areas
that are now the Czech Republic and Slovakia, Hungary, Poland,
Romania, and the areas of the former USSR that are now Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, Russia and the
Ukraine for the period from 1989 to 1993.23
To test whether the returns to educational indoctrination
expenditures dropped with the fall of communism, I regressed the
ratio of total public educational expenditures to total public health
care expenditures alternatively on the totalitarianism ranking or on a
dummy variable that equals one when the country is communist.
Country and year fixed effects were included. Table 6 shows these
variables’ means and standard deviations. The results are striking.
While government educational expenditures as a percentage of GDP
fell by 4 percent from the last year under communism to the last year
in the sample, government health care expenditures as a percentage
of GDP rose by over 70 percent.24
The regression results in Table 7 indicate that when
communism fell, public educational expenditures declined relative to
public health care expenditures. For the first specification, a one
standard deviation change in the totalitarianism index explains about
27 percent of a one standard deviation change in the ratio of public
education to public health care expenditures. According to the
second specification, moving from being a communist to a
noncommunist country implies that the ratio will decline by 27
percentage points. Both specifications include country dummy
variables. The results suggest that our measure of totalitarianism was
23

The Estonia data was available for only one year, 1993, and thus could not
be used determine the changes over time. For seven countries (Belarus,
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, and Ukraine) later
observations were available for 1994 and for four countries (Georgia, Hungary,
Latvia, and Romania) earlier observations for 1980 and 1985. While our
reliance on 1989 as a starting date for most of our sample may mean we miss
some changes because of the anticipated collapse of communism, at least for
Hungary, Latvia, and Romania their ratio of public educational and health care
expenditures exhibited relatively little change from 1985 to 1989.
24 Discussions with UNICEF indicate that this represents a real increase i n
health expenditures and not a mistake in them failing to account for switches i n
accounting practices. UNICEF spent a great deal of time putting these numbers
together for these two categories, and comparisons with other government
expenditures during this period of time are very limited.

17

Public Schooling and Totalitarianism

as accurate as whether a country was labeled “communist” in
determining government expenditures.
V. Totalitarianism and Replacing the
Family as the Source of Values
As suggested earlier for Sweden, governments might attempt to
weaken parental influence by encouraging women to enter the work
force, thus encouraging parents to be away from their children.
While these policies may take many forms (e.g., taxes or government
employment opportunities), I will use the indirect approach of
measuring whether female labor force participation rates vary by type
of government. Other suggestive evidence that would be consistent
with governments raising the cost of parental involvement is the
extent of illegitimate births or divorces. Given the scarcity of time, a
parental influence is more difficult when there is only a single parent
heading a household, and single parents are more likely to rely on
outside substitutes such as the government. Families obviously also
break up in nontotalitarian countries and this will also impact
family-transmitted values, but the question here is whether the rate
of family break up is higher in more totalitarian countries.
Obviously other factors, independent of the influences of
government—such as income, culture, and religion—affect female
labor force participation, illegitimate births, and divorces. Increased
labor force participation and higher education are associated with
fewer children (Lauman, et. al., p. 458). Employing the
specifications used earlier in this paper, including fixed effects and
income, hopefully accounts for at least some of these factors. Any
relationships are also fraught with questions of reverse
causation.25,26 The link between government transfers and family
25

An alternative hypothesis is that more totalitarian and socialist countries
invest in public nursey schools, and promote female labor force participation
rates as a means of promoting sexual equality. Thus the breakdown of the
family is not the desired end result, but a by product that is generated when
governments attempt to promote equality. Yet, with respect to the case of
divorce, women are making higher family specific investments, and thus
making divorces easier facilitates enabling already married men to hold up
married women for the investments that they have made in the family (e.g.,
Parkman,1992).

Chicago Working Paper in Law and Economics

18

breakdown is extremely unreliable because such a breakdown can
induce more transfers, and no emphasis will be place on it here. It is
also conceivable that countries with unstable family relationships
may facilitate totalitarian regimes coming to power in the first place.
Some evidence from East and West Germany suggests that
totalitarianism has an independent effect. Both regions had fairly
similar divorce rates until the imposition communism after World
War II split Germany apart; it was only after the imposition of
communism that the rate in East Germany gradually became higher
(Haskey, 1992).
Finally, more totalitarian governments may start public preprimary schooling at an earlier age, and have a larger percentage of
pre-primary school age children attending government run
schools.27 To test the relationship between totalitarianism and these
two measures of separating children from the influence of their
parents, the type of specification used in Table 3 explaining

Communists have long viewed themselves as advocating changes that liberate
women. Marx viewed it as one of the benefits of the withering away of the
family (McLellan, 1973). Yet, in the Soviet Union these changes have not
produced the “panacea” claimed in Marxist ideology. Smith writes (p. 127) that
many Russian women feel that these “advances” have “made life more trying.”
In addition, it is very easy to find explicit references to using many of these
very same policies to separate children from their families so that the correct
views can be instilled in children (Glenn, 1995).
26 The most direct measure of these predictions would have been the total costs
imposed by governments on families that remain together, though this is not
available. Another problem with divorce rates and other measures is that
governments are not merely changing the costs, but also the returns, to
families remaining intact. In more totalitarian countries, families may have a
greater incentive to remain together because it is more difficult for them to trust
others. It is possible that totalitarian governments are successful even if the
regressions find that families are more stable under totalitarian governments,
simply because these governments may have prevented families from being as
stable as they would otherwise have been. My measure of totalitarianism are
thus likely to underestimate the returns to totalitarian governments weakening
families and thus makes it difficult to find a positive relationship between
totalitarianism and these variables.
27 For this last test, it is not really necessary to distinguish whether a child
went to private schools or remained home with their parents, but simply
whether the child was being educated at this young age by the government.
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educational expenditures is again used here, along with government
expenditures net of educational expenditures.
While the results reported in Table 8 are not as consistently
significant as earlier ones, the general pattern remains similar to
those shown in Tables 2 and 3. In all the specifications, higher
totalitarianism is related to changes that are consistent with raising
the cost of direct parental involvement in forming children’s views.
The first row examines the relationship between the type of
government and female labor force participation. The cross-country
female labor force participation rates for 1989, 1990, and 1991 were
produced by dividing the ratio of females to males in the labor force
by the ratio of females to males in the general population and
expressing this as a percentage (Human Development Report (1993
and 1994)).28 Illegitimacy, in row 2, is measured by the number of
illegitimate births per 100 live births in 1985 (United Nations,
1988). Two measures of divorce are also available over multiple years,
though both are somewhat problematic.29 One measure, which uses
divorces as a percentage of marriages during a particular year, fails to
deal with the stock of pre-existing marriages. A second measure uses
divorces per 1000 population.
Totalitarianism’s impact on family structure in Table 8 is similar
to the effects shown for schooling and government ownership of
television, though the coefficient is not statistically significant for
female labor force participation rates. For two thirds of the sample,
increased totalitarianism increases female labor force participation,
and the effect can be large. For the median income a one standard
28

Using only the variable for females as a percent of males in the labor force
produced even more statistically and economically significant results than those
reported in Table 5. The value for females as a percentage of males in the labor
force for 1989 was obtained from the average for 1988 to 1990, and the value
for 1991 was obtained for the average for 1990 to 1992. I also tried running the
averages for females as a percentage of males in the labor force on the averages
for those years for the measures of totalitarianism, socialism, and per capita
income with similar results.
29 For our purposes, what matters is whether people are married while they are
raising their children, so the assumption is that these measures of divorce are
positively correlated with divorces among couples with minor children. Both
measures of divorce also fail to account (though in a different ways) for the age
distribution of the population.
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deviation change in totalitarianism can explain 24 percent of a one
standard deviation change in female labor force participation. The
regression results indicate that increases in totalitarianism increase
illegitimacy for 77 percent of the sample and raise divorce rates for at
least 73 percent of the sample (using either measure of divorce).
Again, the effects are quite large. Evaluated at the median income a
one standard deviation change in totalitarianism can explain 61
percent of a one standard deviation change in illegitimate births.
The results for school starting age and the percent of pre-school
children attending public schools, provide only mixed support for the
hypothesis.30 While the coefficients signs are consistent with the
indoctrination hypothesis, only the results for pre-school attendance
of public schools are statistically significant.
VI. Totalitarianism and the Rents Educators Receive
A corollary of the view that totalitarian governments value public
schooling to instill desired values is that they will also pay rents to
teachers. When it is difficult to monitor teacher behavior, the
threatened loss of these premiums can help ensure that teachers
work to instill the desired views. The issue is to identify which
teachers must be paid the highest rents in order to elicit their
cooperation.
South Africa during 1981 provides an interesting test. There
were four different school systems coexisting side-by-side in
apartheid era South Africa divided along racial lines: whites, Asians,
coloreds, and blacks.31 Teachers were segregated along the same
30

The data on starting school ages and the percent of pre-school children
attending public schools are obtained from the UNESCO Statistical Yearbook
(1991, 1993, and 1994). The results are available from the author.
31 See the South African Statistics; 1974, pp. 7.23-7.55. The wage data and the
data on the percentage of each racial group in each occupation is taken from the
Survey of Race Relations in South Africa, 1982. The data on the percentage of
whites with standard 10 level of education for all profession other than i n
education was obtained from Josh Gersen, Department of Economics,
University of Cape Town, South Africa. The industry classifications available
were primary and secondary school education, basic metals, metal products,
machinery, electrical, clothing, textiles, chemicals, food, beverages, tobacco,
leather, footwear, wood and cork, furniture, paper and paper products, rubber,
plastic products, nonmetallic minerals, mining, construction, wholesale trade,
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racial lines as the students. My hypothesis would predict that
nonwhite educators receive rents relative to white educators. It was
less costly for a white teacher to support the racist government, in
terms of the amount of opposition he faced. Also white educators
were receiving the general benefits from having a white
government. In contrast, the traditional explanation, which treats
teachers as an interest group whose support is being purchased at the
ballot box, would predict that it is the white—not black—educators
who received the greatest transfers. After all, it is whites and not
blacks who could vote.
To test this, I compiled the natural log of the average white,
Asian, colored, and black monthly wages (LnWage) across thirty
five different industries (Dj, where j=industry), including elementary
and secondary schools as one industry. We also have a dummy
variable for race (ASIAN, AFRICAN, COLORED) and
interactive term for whether someone is both an educator and
belongs to a particular race. Normally, a wage regression would also
include information on education levels for each of the four racial
groups in each industry. (See Table 9 for the means and standard
deviations.) Unfortunately, such data is only available for whites and
it only measures the percent of whites in each industry who have
obtained at least a Standard 10 level of education (approximately
12th grade in American High Schools). I use this variable to rank
the amount of education by industry, and if this specification is to be
accurate, one must assume that the amount of education required for
the different races is strongly correlated across industries. However,
we have no information to indicate whether this is true. Finally, the
percent of workers in an occupation held by each racial group
provides a rough measure to control for industries that restrict entry.
The dummy variable for whites and the one for banking are
excluded so that the intercept term represents white earnings in
banking. I expect the following: the race dummies should be
negative, the interactions between the race and educator dummies

retail trade, motor trade, hotels banking, building societies, manufacturing,
motor vehicle production, Post office, South African Transport System,
Central Government, Provincial Government, Local government, and
insurance companies.
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should be positive, and the percent of whites with standard 10
education by industry should be positive.
The results from running equation (3) are shown in Table 10.
All the coefficients are of the predicted sign. They indicate that even
after the normal return to being an educator is controlled for, being
a nonwhite and an educator increases earnings even more.
Furthermore, each one of the race variables is significant, and the
interactive terms for Africans, Asians, and coloreds are significant at
least at the .10 percent level for a two-tailed t-test. While white
educators have higher absolute earnings, the minority educators
received the greatest rents. Accounting for the percent of an
occupation occupied by each race raised the t-statistics for the race
and education industry dummies, but did not qualitatively alter the
results. To allow more differences in educational attainment across
racial groups, the last two specifications also show the effect of
interacting the PERCENT OF W HITES WITH STANDARD 10
EDUCATION BY INDUSTRY by each of the racial dummies. Again,
the results were very similar.
34
LnWAGE = C + Σ b D + b
ASIAN i + b
AFRICAN +
i
j ji
35
36
i
J=1
b COLORED + b38 ASIAN*EDUCATOR +
37
i
i
b AFRICAN*EDUCATOR +
39
i
b COLORED*EDUCATOR + b PERCENT OF W HITES
40
i
41
WITH STANDARD 10 EDUCATION BY INDUSTRY
i
4
+ Σ b (PERCENT OF AN OCCUPATION HELD BY EACH
R
R= 1
+u
RACIAL GROUP)
(3)
Ri
i
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These results could arise because of greater similarity in skill
across race in education than in other industries.32 Greater
homogeneity in education would presumably have the greatest
impact on Africans who earn the lowest wages in other occupations.
While I cannot completely rule this out, the ranking of the
interactive coefficients for race and whether one is an educator
provide some evidence against this objection. The coefficients for
Asian educators are consistently larger than for African educators.
VII. Conclusion
A consistent relationship exists between the form of government
and the level of investments made in public education. Totalitarian
governments and governments with high transfers spend a lot on
public education and are likely to own television stations. This
cannot be explained simply by greater involvement in all sectors, as
data on health care show. The finding is borne out from crosssectional time-series evidence across countries. A similar relationship
was also found for public educational expenditures during Eastern
Europe’s and the former Soviet Union’s recent transition from
communism.
In addition, this paper examined a broad array of phenomena
that are consistent with more totalitarian and socialist governments
raising the costs of parental involvement in shaping their children’s
values. Examples ranged from raising the female labor participation
rate, the illegitimate birth rate, and divorce rates, as well as lowering
the school age for the public school system. The results correspond

32

The qualifications for nonwhite educators are significantly lower than for
whites. The percent of teachers by race which do not have a teacher’s certificate
or diploma and Standard 10 level of education is 3.36 percent for whites, 85
percent for Africans, 19.7 percent for Asians, and 66.14 percent for Coloreds
(Gordon, et al., 1982). Unfortunately, this type of breakdown was not available
across occupational groups. Another objection is that the supply of nonwhite
educators (those with enough education) is small relative to the number
demanded compared to whites. While this may be true over the short run, i n
the long run it seems that the reverse would be true since nonwhites are
relatively restricted in terms of opportunities. In other words, we expect that
the long run supply of nonwhite educators is more elastic that the long run
supply of white educators.
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closely with those found for government ownership of television and
public educational expenditures.
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Appendix: Data Sources
The totalitarianism ranking from 1985 to 1993 was obtained
from Freedom at Issue, the Jan. - Feb. issues from 1986-1990 and
from Freedom Review, the Jan. - Feb. issues from 1991-1994. The
source for the type of ownership of television stations was the
UNESCO Statistical Yearbook (1989). Primary and secondary public
educational expenditures as a percentage of GNP and as a percentage
of government expenditures were available from the 1989 to 1993
editions of the UNESCO Statistical Yearbook from Table 4.5 and
this was used to calculate government expenditures net of
educational as a percentage of GNP. Observations that included
more than primary and secondary schooling, did not include both, or
only listed expenditures by the central government were excluded.
The age that children are required to start school is obtained from
the 1993 and 1994 editions of the UNESCO Statistical Yearbook,
Table 3.2. The percent of pre-school children attending public
schools is also from that same source from the 1991, 1993, and 1994
editions, Table 3.3. Data on current and total educational
expenditures were also obtained from Table 4.5. The data on
population, a real price index based upon terms of trade to convert
educational expenditures into real 1985 dollars, and real GDP per
capita in constant 1985 dollars using a chain index were obtained
from the Penn World Tables at “http://nber.harvard.edu/.” The
national public health expenditure data for 1990 were obtained from
Murray et al. (1994). The data for the ratio of public educational to
public health care expenditures is obtained from UNICEF’s (August
1994) table on government revenue and expenditure. The average
Coup d’etats rate during 1985-1987 were available from Bienen and
Van De Walle (1991, pp. 109-191).
Tuberculoses, Dpt, polio, measles, and tetanus immunization
rates were obtained from the UNICEF’s The State of the World’s
Children (various years). Data on the percent of illegitimate births
was obtained from the Demographic Yearbook, 1986 (United
Nations, 1988). The divorce rate per 1000 population is from various
issues of the Demographic Yearbook. The marriage rate per 1000
population was obtained from the same source and the measure of
divorces as a percentage of marriages is simply the divorce rate divided
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by the marriage rate. Female labor force participation rates (females
as percent of males) and the ratio of females to males in the
population were both drawn from the United Nation’s Human
Development Report for 1992, 1993, and 1994.
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Table 1
Means and Standard Deviations for International Comparisons Over the Period from 1985 to 1992 of
Government Ownership of Television, Public Educational and Health Care Expenditures, the
Starting Age of School, and the Percent of Nursery School Age Students that Go to Public Schools
(All dollar values are in real 1985 US Dollars Using the Observations from the Heston and Summers World Penn 5
Tables available through the NBER on the Internet)
Observations

Mean

Standard Deviation

Current Educational Expenditures Per Capita

666

278.98

547.34

Total Educational Expenditures Per Capita

707

295.83

587.6

Current Educational Expenditures Per Student

187

1146.04

2917.35

Total Educational Expenditures Per Student

213

Totalitarianism Index

3056.53

1166

7.976

4.1505

Africa

304

-.253

1.0523

Asia

253

-.103

1.164

Europe

250

-.312

1.108

North America

154

-.039

1.0899

South America

84

-.131

1.190

Government Expenditures/GDP

513

42.179

25.879

Average Yearly Change in Totalitarian Index for consecutive years

31

Government Expenditures net of Public Educational
Expenditures/GDP

499

35.615

23.353

GDP per capita

891

5011.51

4921.96

Government Ownership of Television

119

0.857

0.3359

The percent of one-year-old children fully immunized against
tuberculosis

834

73.62

25.56

The percent of one-year-old children fully immunized against Dpt

914

68.55

25.1

The percent of one-year-old children fully immunized against polio

914

70.98

25.186

The percent of one-year-old children fully immunized against
measles

911

65.74

23.9

The percent of pregnant women fully immunized from tetanus

568

38.46

25.57

Avg. yearly rate of coup d’etats a country experienced between 1985
and 1987

406

0.0222

0.1633

Female Labor Force Participation Rate

382

0.5374

0.2420

Illegitimate Births per 100 Live Births in 1985

29

26.45

24.568

Divorces as a Percent of Marriages Contracted

486

0.2312

0.1429

Divorces per 1000 population

491

1.6216

1.3857

Starting Age for Education in years of age

841

3.667

0.84429

Percentage of Pre-School Age Children in Public Schools

499

45.58

35.09
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Table 2
Government Ownership of Television and Totalitarianism:
Establishing the Relationship
(Probit regressions with chi-squared values shown in the parentheses, year dummy variables not shown)

Dependent Variable
Totalitarianism rating
GDP/Population
GDP2/Pop.
(Totalitarianism*GDP/Pop)
Gov Exp/GDP
Intercept
Pseudo-R2
Chi squared
Number of obs.

1. Government
Ownership of Television
0.2887*
(2.502)
0.0000866
(1.099)
...

3. Government
Ownership of Television
0.2038*
(2.844)
...

-7.60 e-06
(1.498)
0.0342*
(2.790)
-2.2312*
(2.059)
0.2944

2. Government
Ownership of Television
0.3037*
(2.332)
0.000152
(0.553)
-3.24 e-09
(0.733)
-9.05 e-06
(1.573)
0.0331*
(2.673)
-2.4371**
(1.778)
0.2956

15.70
58

15.76
58

14.61
59

* statistically significant at least at the 5 percent level
** statistically significant at least at the 10 percent level
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...
...
0.0378*
(2.998)
-1.468**
(1.778)
0.2720

Table 3
Public Schooling Expenditures and Totalitarianism: OLS Regresssions
(t-statistics shown in parentheses and Country Dummies and Fixed Year Effects for Each Continent are controlled for
in specifications 1 and 2. Because over half of the sample for specifications 3 and 4 involve countries with only one
observation, these specifications control for only Fixed Year Effects for Each Continent. Similarly, because there is
only one observation per country for the regressions using the sample means by country, specifications 5 and 6 only
account for continent fixed effects.)
Using Sample Means by Country
1. Current real
public school
expenditures
per capita

2. Current real
public school
expenditures
per capita

3. Current real
public school
expenditures
per capita

4. Current real
public school
expenditures
per capita

5. Current real
public school
expenditures
per capita

6. Current real
public school
expenditures
per capita

Totalitarianism
rating

58.301
(3.616)

56.06
(3.562)

220.9
(2.585)

185.7
(1.941)

29.99
(2.983)

200.12
(2.330)

GDP/Population

0.1141
(3.596)

-0.097
(1.478)

0.633
(8.205)

0.452
(1.943)

0.1227
(12.63)

0.683
(8.507)

...

0.0000096
(3.837)

...

0.000009
(1.824)

...

...

Dependent
Variable

GDP 2 /Pop
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Table 3 (continued)
(Totalitarianism
rating*GDP/Pop)

-0.0047
(1.479)

-0.005
(1.394)

-0.0506
(3.996)

-0.0483
(3.735)

-0.001
(7.218)

-0.022
(5.625)

Gov Exp/GDP

6.228
(3.596)

7.06
(4.146)

2.374
(1.241)

4.115
(5.591)

.907
(0.818)

7.07
(0.796)

Intercept

-973.92
(5.044)

-644.6
(2.121)

-3982.9
(2.640)

-3234
(1.834)

-353.1
(3.401)

-2379.9
(2.671)

Adj-R2

.9072

.8800

.6363

.6351

.7563

.6214

F-statistic

9.55

30.96

15.8

14.67

81.70

37.51

Number of obs.

407

407

110

110

105

90
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Table 4
Government Health Care Expenditures and Totalitarianism in 1990
(t-statistics shown in parentheses and continent dummies also controlled for)
1. Real Government Expenditures
on Health Care per capita

2. Real Government Expenditures
on Health Care per capita

Totalitarianism rating

2.8968
(0.705)

2.8142
(0.655)

GDP/Population

0.1228
(17.726)

0.06338
(2.782)

...

3.49 e-06
(2.733)

(Totalitarianism rating*GDP/Pop)

-0.0135
(6.835)

-0.0098
(4.126)

Gov Exp/GDP Net of Health Exp

0.0349
(0.045)

0.0987
(0.129)

Intercept

-21.962
(0.520)

19.80
(0.449)

adj-R2

.7455

.7559

F-statistic

115.26

97.63

157

157

Dependent Variable

GDP2/Pop.

Number of obs.
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Table 5 (Part 1)
Children’s Immunization Rates and Totalitarianism from 1985 to 1992
(t-statistics shown in parentheses.)
Pooled Cross-Sectional Time-Series Data with Year and Country Fixed Effects
1. % of Children
fully immunized
against tuberculosis

2. % of Children
fully immunized
against Dpt

3. % of Children
fully immunized
against polio

4. % of Children
fully immunized
against measles

5. % of Pregnant
Women fully immnz’d
against tetanus

Totalitarianism
rating

-1.1565
(1.211)

-.4430
(0.511)

-.4179
(0.521)

1.60914
(1.6091)

-1.5083
(0.786)

GDP/Population

-0.0041
(1.899)

-.0028
(1.523)

-.0045
(2.523)

0.00279
(1.494)

0.0109
(1.772)

(Totalitarianism
rating*GDP/Pop)

0.0000376
(1.682)

0.0004343
(2.159)

0.000425
(2.231)

0.0000132
(0.064)

0.00049
(0.713)

Gov Exp/GDP Net
of Health Exp

0.04858
(0.464)

0.01189
(0.129)

0.0349
(0.045)

-0.00682
(0.072)

-0.7286
(2.581)

Intercept

-21.962
(0.520)

65.633
(2.199)

95.975
(3.380)

8.5515
(0.278)

-21.962
(0.520)

adj-R2

.7934

.8022

.8195

.7737

.6200

F-statistic

15.22

16.66

18.47

14.30

5.94

349

387

386

386

216

Dependent
Variable

Number of obs.
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Table 5 (Part 2)
Children’s Immunization Rates and Totalitarianism from 1985 to 1992
(t-statistics shown in parentheses.)
Using Sample Means by Country
6. % of Children
fully immunized
against tuberculosis

7. % of Children
fully immunized
against Dpt

8. % of Children
fully immunized
against polio

9. % of Children
fully immunized
against measles

10. % of Pregnant
Women fully immnz’d
against tetanus

Totalitarianism
rating

-1.5487
(1.682)

-3.338
(3.946)

-3.9803
(4.924)

-2.1877
(2.529)

-.9136
(0.706)

GDP/Population

-0.0018
(1.652)

-.00135
(1.615)

-.00161
(2.016)

-.00122
(1.432)

0.0032
(1.053)

(Totalitarianism
rating*GDP/Pop)

0.00034
(2.461)

0.000411
(3.763)

0.000439
(4.200)

0.000374
(3.345)

0.000067
(0.214)

Gov Exp/GDP Net
of Health Exp

0.1793
(1.930)

0.3523
(4.536)

0.3671
(4.946)

0.2984
(3.757)

-.0561
(0.355)

Intercept

83.94
(7.841)

82.90
(9.584)

89.85
(10.871)

71.93
(8.132)

44.71
(3.235)

adj-R2

.0911

.4628

.5287

.3269

.1889

F-statistic

2.91

18.01

23.16

23.16

4.20

77

80

80

80

56

Dependent
Variable

Number of obs.
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Table 6
Means and Standard Deviations for Examining the Changes
in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Republics
Observations

Mean

Standard Deviation

Public Educational Expenditures as a Percentage of GDP

89

4.8697

1.246

Public Health Care Expenditures as a Percentage of GDP

90

3.61

1.3472

Ratio of Public Educational to Public Health Care Expenditures

88

1.4674

0.5187

Totalitarianism Index

68

8.691

3.347

Dummy Variable for Whether a Country was still Communist

88

0.4337

0.4986
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Table 7
What happened to Educational Expenditures in Eastern European Countries
When Communism Collapsed?: Controlling for Country Fixed Effects
1. The ratio of a Country’s Public
Education to Public Health Care
Expenditures in a particular year

2. The ratio of a Country’s Public
Education to Public Health Care
Expenditures in a particular year

0.042
(3.670)

...

...

0.2667
(5.081)

Intercept

1.1514
(7.606)

1.3305
(13.913)

adj-R2

0.8253

0.8114

20.21

25.96

62

88

Totalitarianism Rating
Dummy Variable for whether a
country was still Communist

F-statistic
Number of obs.
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Table 8
How the Return to Weakening the Family Varies with the Type of Government
(t-statistics shown in parentheses, the fixed effect dummies are not shown. Both country and year
fixed effects are used for rows 3 and 4. Because only a couple of years data are available for row 1,
only continent and year fixed effects are used. Row 2 uses only one year worth of data and thus uses
only continent fixed effects.)

Dependent
Variable
Totalitarianism
rating
GDP/Population
(Totalitarianism
rating*GDP/Pop)
Gov Exp/GDP
Intercept
adj-R2
F-statistic
Number of obs.

1. Female
Labor Force
Participation
Rate Adjusted
0.0426
(1.431)
0.0000578*
(2.069)
-0.00000951*
(2.096)
0.00002
(1.470)
0.2566
(0.755)
0.1060

2. Illegitimate
Births per 100
Live Births
5.8594*
(1.945)
0.0028
(1.055)
-0.00075**
(1.874)
-0.0008
(0.750)
-2.4209
(0.093)
0.1639

3. Divorces as a
% of marriages
contracted
0.0233*
(4.490)
0.000044*
(5.055)
-3.42 e-06*
(3.439)
-.000051*
(5.552)
0.1176
(0.318)
0.9332

4. Divorces
per 1000
population
0.1074*
(4.753)
0.00021*
(5.502)
-.000016*
(3.692)
-.00017*
(4.236)
0.6202*
(3.224)
0.9706

5. Starting Age
for Public
Nursery Schools
-0.01513
(1.071)
0.000005
(0.278)
0.00000134
(0.516)
-0.0106*
(5.692)
4.4901*
(16.686)
.0825

6. % of Nursery
School-Age
Children in Public
Nursery Schools
4.03516*
(5.678)
0.000662
(1.064)
-0.00016**
(1.686)
0.4326*
(6.571)
-11.786*
(7.525)
.4073

3.23
172

2.72
24

1.79
271

1.59
272

4.03
372

36.87
262

* statistically significant at least at the 5 percent level, ** statistically significant at least at the 10 percent level
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Table 9
Means and Standard Deviations for Examining
the Monthly Wages in South Africa in 1980
Observations
Ln(Wage)

Mean

Standard Deviation

139

6.1317

0.61318

Percentage of Whites with Standard
10 Education by Industry

139

81.12

10.813

Percent of Occupation Occupied by
Africans

139

0.4712

0.1937

Percent of Occupation Occupied by
Asians

139

0.0603

0.0623

Percent of Occupation Occupied by
Coloreds

139

0.1634

0.1021

Percent of Occupation Occupied by
Whites

139

0.3068

0.1973
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Table 10
Rents to Educators in South Africa
Endogenous variable is log of monthly wage
(Specifications 2 and 4 also control for the Percent
of Occupation Occupied by each Racial Group)
INTERCEPT
1) 5.269
(22.052)
Adj-R2 =.9066
F-statistic = 34.51
Obs. = 139

2) 5.4811
(28.121)
Adj-R2 =.9405
F-statistic = 50.59
Obs. = 139

3) 5.0380
(12.777)
Adj-R2=.9051
F-statistic = 31.59
Obs. = 139

4) 5.2156
(16.479)
Adj-R2=.9415
F-statistic = 48.30
Obs. = 139

Education Industry
Dummy

.0684
(0.331)

0.0963
(0.561)

.03813
(0.207)

0.0042
(0.029)

African

-1.4074
(30.973)

-1.678
(16.297)

-1.1619
(3.371)

-1.5709
(5.577)

Asian

-.7676
(16.725)

-0.8934
(12.627)

-.4155
(1.185)

-0.3361
(1.084)

Colored

-1.1295
(24.857)

-1.288
(15.429)

-1.1619
(3.371)

-1.2871
(4.206)
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Table 10 (continued)
African* Educator

0.5025
(1.869)

0.4927
(2.296)

0.5302
(1.936)

0.5033
(2.339)

Asian* Educator

0.6882
(2.559)

0.6576
(3.063)

0.7296
(2.661)

0.7180
(3.335)

Colored* Educator

0.4602
(1.712)

0.4493
(2.094)

0.4659
(1.701)

0.4488
(2.087)

Percent of Whites
with Standard 10
Level of Education

0.01873
(6.070)

0.0190
(7.726)

...

...

Percent of Whites with Standard 10 by Industry interacted with dummy variables for:
Whites

...

...

0.02205
(3.688)

0.0229
(4.866)

Coloreds

...

...

0.0214
(3.385)

0.0230
(4.588)

Asians

...

...

0.0177
(2.775)

0.0164
(3.220)

Blacks

...

...

0.0190
(3.005)

0.0218
(4.350)
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